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1. INTRODUCTION.
It is well know that in 1923 the Financial Committee Report prepared for the 
League of Nations by the so called four economists, under the leadership of Edwin R.A. 
Seligman1 concluded that economic allegiance between income and the taxing state is 
the basis of tax jurisdiction. Criteria as varied as residence, nationality, domicile, and 
source were at this moment discussed as being indicative of economic allegiance, but 
nowadays residence of individuals and legal entities is the most important connecting 
factor in allocating the jurisdiction to tax, in both domestic law and tax treaties. 
But for the definition of residence -due to their legal traditions, historical 
factors, etc.- different countries use in their tax laws elements that, although partially 
interchangeable, may be somewhat different. These differences might produce 
conflicts of double residence, because two countries could concurrently treat an 
individual or a company as a resident for tax purposes with the consequence that both 
would claim worldwide income taxation. Alongside this, tax arbitrage and tax planning 
may arise because of the remarked differences, and besides significant non-tax 
consequences there are noteworthy advantages mostly related to income and 
inheritance taxes2. 
International tax competition contributes to enhace this scenario due to great 
capital mobility, withholding taxation removal by many developed countries and the 
emergence of new preferential tax regimes, but also due to the failure on tackling tax 
havens. These factors that may be relevant for individual taxation purposes, are even 
*
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1
 It has become a commonplace to attribute to this Report the key role in fashioning the modern 
international tax regime; see AVI-YONAH, R.S. "The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for 
Simplification", in Texas Law Review vol. 74, 1995-1996, pp. 1305 ss. 
2
 Because sometimes the same concept of residence is used for income, wealth and inheritance tax 
purposes; see RUST, A. "The Concept of Residence in Inheritance Tax Law", in MAISTO, G. (ed.) 
Residence of Individuals under Tax Treaties and EC Law, IBFD, Amsterdam 2010, p. 87. 
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more critical in company taxation. Indeed, competition for inbound investment has led 
an increasing number of countries to offer reductions in their effective tax rates (or 
even the so called "tax holidays") to foreign corporate investors3. And given the 
relative ease with which multinational groups can relocate their tax residence -if not 
their production facilities- in response to tax rates, such tax competition enables 
multinationals to obtain most of their income free or with a very low taxation. 
For this reason, residence is a matter of considerable importance, and it will 
likely continue to be of the utmost importance, as personal and economic activity 
becomes increasingly mobile. And as residence electivity 4 is also relevant for tax 
planning purposes -for individuals5 and companies-  I will try in this article to analize 
the role that changes in residence plays in tax planning and how different countries are 
trying to act in this respect, developing first some considerations regarding the role 
and meaning of the concept of residence (2), that will allow us to point some tax 
planning opportunities derived from asymmetries regarding the residence definition 
by domestic tax laws in different countries. We will then pinpoint those strategies and 
their risks by analyzing some case law and other cases that are in the center of the 
public debate (3). This kind of tax planning schemes, which are normally the result of 
state’s competition in the tax arena, are also the basis for the development of 
defensive measures, i.e. residence concept enlargement or exit/expatriation taxes. The 
study of these measures will probably confirm that to counteract tax planning related 
with residence through these  anti-abuse provisions may cause other residence related 
concerns (4) and thereby plead for other kind of measures that could better help tax 
administration in achieving their tasks.  
2. SOME REMARKS ON THE CONCEPT OF TAX RESIDENCE.
As stated, residence is the most spread connecting factor to determine 
worldwide income taxation in a certain country, regardless income source. It is a 
3
 See AVI-YONAH, R.S. "Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State", in 
Harvard Law Review, vol. 113, 2000, pp. 1576 y 1579 ss. 
4
 See SHAVIRO, D. "The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence", Tax Law Review vol. 64, 2011, 
pp. 377 ss. 
5
 As indicates that the IFA devotes its 2002 Congress to the topic; see IFA The Tax Treatment of the 
Transfer of Residence by Individuals, Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International, vol. LXXXVIIb, Kluwer, The 
Netherlands 2002. 
2
reasonable parameter to establish a link between a person and a tax system and a 
standard not only among OECD members but also adopted by countries that 
traditionally rejected it; therefore the use of other criteria -vgr. nationality6- is 
exceptional at the present time7.  
This probably occurs because residence is a connecting factor that can reflect a 
relatively substantial and intimate relationship between a country and a person, 
depending on the precise concept being employed, even if in the case of companies 
residence might be viewed as somewhat artificial8. 
We should set aside the analysis of domestic law criteria9 to focus on some 
general remarks on this connecting factor. 
In this sense, it is relevant to stress that in the area of taxation the different 
treatment of the basis of residence parameters is the rule rather than the exception. 
The use of permanence criteria, the center of vital interests, domicile or disposal of a 
habitual abode; the place of incorporation, the legal seat of a company or the place of 
effective management for legal entities illustrates this reality. To put it in other words, 
although residence is nearly the only criterion that exists to allocate the jurisdiction to 
tax on worldwide basis, a considerable diversity exists on the elements used to its 
determination which are built by countries on a self-determined, uncoordinated 
basis10. Probably, this is the reason why Art. 4(1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
on Income and on Capital (OECD MTC hereinafter), defines residence not by reference 
to the circumstances which determines it -that should be established by the domestic 
6
 Which is still used by the US, see VACOVEC, Kenneth .J. and BEUTLER, Todd M. "United States", in IFA 
The Tax Treatment... cit., pp. 597 ss. 
7
 CALDERÓN CARRERO, J.M. La doble imposición internacional y los métodos para su eliminación, 
McGraw-Hill, Madrid 1997, pp. 27-28. 
8
 NIKOLAKAKIS, A. "Civil Law and Common Law Perspectives: A View from the Left", in MAISTO, G. (ed.) 
Residence of Individuals... cit., pp. 76-77. 
9
 In addition to the references that one can find in the IFA Branch Reports, in IFA The Tax Treatment… 
cit., pp. 97 ss.; and in IFA Source and residence: new configuration of their principles, Cahiers de Droit 
Fiscal International, vol. 90a, Kluwer, The Netherlands 2005, pp. 58 ss. and the Branch Reports; see for 
individuals the Country Reports in MAISTO, Guglielmo (ed.) Residence of Individuals... cit., pp. 197 ss.; 
and for companies the Country Reports in MAISTO, Guglielmo (ed.) Residence of Companies under Tax 
Treaties and EC Law, IBFD, Amsterdam 2009, pp. 311 ss. 
10
 CALDERÓN CARRERO, José Manuel. La doble imposición... cit., p. 28. 
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law of each state- but by the effect it produces, i.e. the liability to tax on a worlwide 
basis11. 
In any case, from a theoretical point of view the concept of residence should be 
equitable, administrable and difficult to manipulate12. From an equity perspective, 
unlimited taxation on residents has been justified by the ability to pay principle, 
particularly in relation to income taxation of individuals, because equity -whether 
horizontal or vertical- is best satisfied by the unlimited taxation of residents since it 
affords equal treatment by law regardless of where income is derived from13. The 
relationship between residence and the ability to pay principle has been criticized as 
the latter does not indicate which part of the income earned in a cross-border 
situation can be taxed in the residence state and which part in the source state. But 
even if one has to share this criticism, because the unlimited taxation of residents is 
better justified by the benefits principle, if we take into account the actual or potential 
benefits that the taxpayers attain from government-supplied goods and services14, it 
seems to be truth that circumstances that give rise to residence ascertainment should 
be consistent with both principles. In other words, besides Art. 4(1) of the OECD MC 
permit a wide field for countries to establish circumstances which define residence, 
those criteria cannot be random selected as it is necessary to consider exclusively the 
state with which a taxpayer maintains the stronger attachment from the benefits 
principle perspective, and thus the one that has the best position in order to take into 
account its ability to pay.  
Besides the ability to pay principle does not play any role within the 
determination of the extent to which each state may levy tax in a cross-border 
transaction, it is truth that the residence state is especially legitimated to take into 
account the whole income obtained by a person -including foreign source income- to 
properly quantify a concrete tax, both because equity reasons and because the 
11
 WHEELER, Joanna “The Missing Keystone of Income Tax Treaties”, in World Tax Journal, vol. 3, 2011, 
p. 251; in this sense OECD Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing 2013, p. 34
states that “Residence, for treaty purposes, depends on liability to tax under the domestic law of the 
taxpayer”. 
12
 RUST, A. "The Concept of Residence..." cit., p. 85 ss. 
13
 See SCHINDEL, Angel and ATCHABAHIAN, Adolfo “General Report”, in IFA Source and residence: new 
configuration of their principles, Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International, vol. 90a, Kluwer, The Netherlands 
2005, pp. 31 ss. 
14
 MÖSSNER, Manfred “Source versus Residence – and EU Perspective”, in Bulletin for International 
Taxation, vol. 60, 2006, p. 505.  
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residence of individuals overlaps to some extent with their political allegiance, a factor 
that links tax levies with the non taxation without representation principle, one of the 
main pillars for the rule of law in tax matters. 
In addition, the concept of residence should be administrable, i.e. criteria for its 
determination should be clear in order not to produce excessive conflicts in its 
practical application. From this point of view, residence-based taxation makes sense 
for individuals, since residence is relatively easy to determine in the case of individuals; 
most individuals are part of only one society, and residence overlaps with political 
allegiance, beeing a proxy for taxation with representation15. Indeed, even if there are 
some difficult cases, residence of individuals can be defined on bright-line rules, such 
as a number of days of permanence -the so called 183-day test- some individual facts 
and circumstances test -domicile, home, centre of family or economic interest- or 
other specific criteria such as engagement in government services, diplomatic 
activities, etc. Despite all the difficulties -which will be analyzed below- the truth is that 
individuals can only be in one place at any given time, so their residence is a relatively 
easy concept to establish, specially if we confront the concept of residence with the 
concept of source, because the definition of the latter amounts to a highly problematic 
endeavor16, as the concept of source is in itself controversial due to the lack of 
connection with the economic reality, i.e. with the facts that give rise to its 
determination, as in most cases income will have more than one source. Also, it is 
quite relevant that residence-determining criteria should be easy to manage, i.e. in a 
cross-border situation, the current as well as the former residence countries dispose of 
the necessary information to asses the tax base and to collect the pertinent tax 
revenue. 
Things are quite different on legal entities residence matters, not only because 
the justification of residence taxation of companies gives rise to many difficulties17 but 
also because it is quite complicated to specify criteria that could be properly managed 
for the tax residence to be determined. From this point of view, residence of 
15
 AVI-YONAH, Reuven S. “Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage and the International Tax Regime”, in Bulletin 
for International Taxation, vol. 61, 2007, p. 134. 
16
 See for a further development on this arguments AVI-YONAH, Reuven S. "The Structure of 
International…” cit., pp. 1311-1312; and SCHINDEL, Angel and ATCHABAHIAN, Adolfo “General Report” 
cit., pp. 31 ss. 
17
 AVI-YONAH, Reuven S. "The Structure of International…” cit., p. 1313. 
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companies is a complicated matter as the clash between domestic and tax treaty 
policies of many states may cause uncertainties, especially within multinational 
enterprises. Corporations are not individuals, and the awareness of this basic 
difference is essential in seeking an acceptable rule or set of rules to define their 
residence. Indeed, companies can be present in different jurisdictions at a time, a fact 
that increases difficulties in determining their tax residence. 
In any case, it is relevant to emphasize that most States use a combination of 
formal and substantive criteria to determine companies’ residence. The formal tests 
used are either the place of incorporation or the place where the company's registered 
office -or legal seat- is established; and as substantial test most of the countries 
determine the companies’ residence as the place where the effective management is 
situated, an all facts and circumstantes test18. All these criteria have been criticized as 
residence of corporations is difficult to establish and relatively meaningless when is 
based upon criteria such as the place of incorporation, which is formalistic and subject 
to the taxpayer’s control -just as the legal seat criterion-; notwithstanding, residence 
based on management and control can also be manipulated19. 
From a practical perspective, place of incorporation and legal seat are two 
residence criteria that have the advantage of simplicity and predictability for 
taxpayers, tax administrations and tax courts. However, these criteria have been 
properly criticized as empirical studies demonstrate that the decision whether to 
incorporate a company or where this should be done, as well as where to situate the 
legal seat are influenced by tax motives, and so tax planning opportunities or tax 
avoidance schemes may arise20. Moreover, where a country applies a formal test to 
determine corporate tax residence and that country has a beneficial tax regime certain 
risks emerge, i.e. companies may be tempted to incorporate companies to enjoy tax 
benefits but not necessarily a genuine nexus with that country may appear21. In this 
sense, the use of the place of incorporation as a connecting factor is one of the main 
reasons for the adoption of limitation-on-benefits provisions in an increasing number 
18
 DE BROE, Luc "Corporate Tax Residence in Civil Law Jurisdictions", in MAISTO, Guglielmo (ed.) 
Residence of Companies... cit., p. 96. 
19
 AVI-YONAH, Reuven S. “Tax Competition..." cit., pp. 134-135. 
20
 WEBER-FAS, Rudolph "Corporate Residence Rules for International Tax Jurisdiction: A Study of 
American and German Law", in Harvard Journal on Legislation, vol. 5, 1967-1968, p. 228 
21
 DE BROE, Luc "Corporate Tax..." cit., p. 101. 
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of tax treaties22. These provisions are indeed a symptom which evidence that the mere 
incorporation connection or the legal seat are in themselves not accepted, but the 
concurrence of other supportive elements are needed in order to claim the treaty 
protection. 
The point is that neither those formal criteria are satisfactory nor the place of 
effective management serves for these purposes as it requires a case-by-case analysis 
of all fact and circumstances and thus leaves a wide margin of interpretation to tax 
authorities and the courts23. Even more, the place of effective management is not easy 
to manage since it demands all the relevant facts and circumstances knowledge, items 
that will not always be on tax administrations or tax courts hands to properly decide 
whatsoever.   
Lastly a residence concept should be difficult to manipulate, so that residence 
cannot be easily given up in one country and established in another country or at least 
it should guarantee that changes of residence do not easily alter an individual or 
corporation tax regime. From this perspective we have ascertained that the use of 
formal criteria enables residence manipulation schemes, forcing states to establish 
restrictions or anti abuse rules that may lead to increase tax law complexity. Aside 
from such formal jurisdictional approaches may have a tendency to multiply potential 
situations of double residence that may prompt double taxation scenarios or tax 
planning opportunities, as we will state below. As formal criteria increase electivity 
practices by means of place of incorporation and legal seat alterations -specially for 
start ups-, tougher residence rules on corporation residence matters have been 
proposed24. Moreover, in the Discussion Paper on Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 
the U.S. Treasury has suggested that "a review of current residency definitions and 
taxation rules may be appropriate"; even if it is hard to see what definition of 
corporate residence can be adopted that will avoid these problems25. 
Although manipulation on individuals residence criteria is more complicated, 
this fact does not mean that issues may arise, specially nowadays as permanence 
assessment is virtually impossible due to increase mobility and loss of frontier 
22
 WHEELER, Joanna “The Missing Keystone...” cit., pp. 294-295. 
23
 DE BROE, Luc "Corporate Tax..." cit., p. 102. 
24
 SHAVIRO, Daniel "The Rising Tax-Electivity..." cit., pp. 413 ss.  
25
 AVI-YONAH, Reuven S. "Globalization, Tax Competition..." cit., p. 1596. 
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restraints in certain geographical areas. Thus, tax planning opportunities arise and are 
of great interest on wealth and inheritance taxes, which frequently use a concept of 
residence similar to the one present in income taxation matters. This is the reason why 
also in the field of individuals’ taxation extension of residence and fictitious residence 
rules have been enacted to prevent opportunistic changes of residence that may be 
used to obtain tax advantages, albeit new issues may arise from their application. 
Similar considerations could be stated regarding the concept of residence in tax 
treaties as long as its call for domestic law application, so the diversity of criteria is still 
present in this kind of scenarios. In this sense, Art. 4(1) OECD MC lists a number of 
criteria that are typically used in domestic law for defining residence that should be 
interpreted according with domestic laws rules26. This inevitably produces -in addition 
to double taxation or double non-taxation issues- double residence problems that may 
be solved by resorting to Art. 4(2) and 4(3) OECD MC, in which a series of tests are 
introduced in order to assign residence exclusively to one specific state for tax treaties 
purposes. These conflicts are not easy to solve because despite one assume that a 
provision intended to solve conflicts arising from differences in the concept of 
residence in domestic laws should be interpreted independently from these domestic 
laws, the practice shows that there has been different approaches on tie breaker rules 
often based or influenced by domestic law27. 
Moreover, the solution to double residence conflicts will be always 
controversial because it frequently depends on two open and vague concepts, i.e. the 
centre of vital interests for individuals and the place of effective management for 
companies. Although other tie break rules for individuals may be less problematic and 
their application arise fundamentally proof issues, in respect of the centre of vital 
interest its interpretation is often controversial. Indeed it has been suggested that an 
individual centre of vital interest should only be determined to be in a particular state 
if personal and economic relations point clearly towards that state; if any kind of 
26
 WIDRIG, Marcel “The Expression “by Reason of his Domicile, Residence, Place of Management …” as 
Applied to Companies”, in MAISTO, Guglielmo Residence of Companies… cit., pp. 273-274. 
27
 SASSEVILLE, Jacques “History and Interpretation of the Tiebreaker Rue in the Art. 4(2) of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention”, in MAISTO, Guglielmo Residence of Individuals… cit., p. 162. 
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uncertainty remains, the third preference criterion should apply 28 . These 
considerations are also relevant with regard to the place of effective management, 
whose implementation poses a lot of problems in complex cases, such as holding 
companies with an international board that meets in different locations, multinational 
companies with subsidiaries throughout the world that are in fact very tightly 
managed from the parent, or finance and royalty conduit companies29.  
In short, residence determination must be performed through domestic law -
due to Art. 4(1) reference- by applying heterogeneous criteria whose interpretation by 
tax authorities and courts may not be identical and inevitably give rise to residence 
conflicts and tax planning opportunities that must be scrutinized.  
3. TAX RESIDENCE AS AN ELEMENT FOR TAX PLANING.
The interaction between independent sets of tax residence rules enforced by 
sovereign countries may give rise to frictions, including potential conflicts of double 
residence; but also creates gaps in cases where these interactions lead to double non-
taxation. Countries views differ in regard to the definition of residence and 
circumstances that should be used for its determination. Since wealthy taxpayers 
everywhere can be expected to try to lower their tax burdens to the minimum, it 
follows naturally that they -or more likely their tax advisors- will study the rules of 
individual countries and seek to turn them to their advantage, electing in some way 
their residence. Hence, the so-called residence “electivity”30 might be an important 
element for international tax arbitrage by taking advantage of differences in residence 
definitions by domestic tax laws31. 
The ability to elect the residence and -as a consequence- its use for tax planning 
is quite different for individuals than for companies. For the formers, residence is in a 
certain way a given circumstance that often depends on the place of birth or the 
parents residence or nationality. To put it in other words, tax planning for individuals 
28
 BAKER, Philip “The Expression “Centre of Vital Interest” in Art. 4(2) of the OECD Model Convention”, 
in MAISTO, Guglielmo Residence of Individuals… cit., p. 173. 
29
 VAN WEEGHEL, Stef “Article 4(3) of the OECD Model Convention: An Inconvinient Truth”, in MAISTO, 
Guglielmo Residence of Companies… cit., pp. 305 ss. 
30
 In the terms used by SHAVIRO, Daniel "The Rising Tax-Electivity..” cit. pp. 377 ss. 
31
 See about residence as an element in tax arbitrage ROSENBLOOM, H. David “International Tax 
Arbitrage and the International Tax System”, in Tax Law Review vol. 53, 1999-2000, p. 140.  
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consists in moving from one country to another, transferring residence and giving 
place to issues of allocation of taxing powers between the country of former residence 
(hereafter the emigration country) and the country of new residence (hereafter the 
immigration country). On the other hand, companies have the opportunity to select 
their place of incorporation and legal seat, a fact that gives them the opportunity to 
analyze the tax consequences that may arise from their country election but also to 
properly locate the place of effective management. Besides, companies may choose to 
change their residence –and not just from a tax perspective– to move to another 
jurisdiction both from a direct way or by means of complex restructuring schemes. 
3.1.Transfer of residence by individuals and tax planning. 
Taking residence as a given circumstance for individuals, its use for tax planning 
is possible only through the transfer from one country to another. At first glance it 
appears that the most efficient and easiest way to avoid domestic taxes is simply to 
leave one jurisdiction and move to another one. This option is more clement for the 
taxpayer, as this formula would not require sophisticated planning to be implemented. 
However, in practice, this assumption is not correct, because of the non-tax 
implications of an emigration, the emotional impact on the taxpayer -and his family- 
who has to abandon his home and his country (and thus relatives, friends, service 
clubs, etc.) for mere tax purposes. Furthermore, many practical arrangements have to 
be made (utilities, phone numbers, address cards, social security, hospitalization, 
doctors, dentist, etc.) and a change of residence or domicile can have a significant legal 
impact on, inter alia, marital property law, inheritance law, alimony obligations in 
divorce situations, the legal capacity of children and on laws governing the right of 
access to children32. 
For this reason, even if nobody can discuss that transfers of residence may also 
be tax motivated33, this type of planning seems to be very drastic and radical, since it 
implies an actual emigration. Hence, this kind of tax planning takes place normally for 
high net worth individuals, who think not only in terms of income taxation but also in 
32
 VAN ZANTBEEK, Anton "Tax-Driven Relocation of High Net Worth Individuals: Where to Run to?", in 
European Taxation vol. 50, 2010, p.196. 
33
 DE BROE, Luc "General Report", in IFA The Tax Treatment of the Transfer... cit., p. 28. 
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wealth and inheritance taxes34; or for individuals with a high level of income who 
travel for professional reasons around the world, tipically sportsman and artists. In 
fact, there are notorious cases to be remarked: the famous german tennis player Boris 
Becker, whose change in residence to Monaco was characterized as a mere sham, for 
which he was trialed for tax evasion35; the Spanish tennis player Arantxa Sánchez 
Vicario, whose residence in Andorra was challenged by the Spanish tax authorities who 
applied the domestic definition of residence36; or the opera singer Luciano Pavarotti, a 
case of dual residence that has been highly controversial37. In those cases, the transfer 
of residence to a tax haven country seemed to be tax motivated because if we take 
into account their sources of income this kind of taxpayers can easily minimize their 
tax burden on income and also on wealth tax, which normally follows the residence 
criteria established on income tax law. But assuming that the transfer of residence is 
not a mere sham, these kinds of changes on residence are legally indisputable, even if 
they are strongly rejected by the public opinion38. Probably for this reason, some 
countries have adopted certain defensive measures in order to extent residence time 
periods for nationals who move their residence to tax havens, measures that rise 
inevitable issues. 
In any case, problems usually appear when changes of residence take place 
without a proper restructuring on the individual assets. If an available permanent 
34
 See for some examples of high profile expatriates from the United States HALABI, Oz "Expatriation Tax 
- Renouncing a Tax TReaty, in Bulletin for International Taxation, July 2012, p. 377. 
35
 An accurate description of the case in the BBC website, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2355147.stm (last review September the 5th 2013).  
36
 See the Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), 7270/2009 Ruling, November 11th 2009; and 
VAN ZANTBEEK, Anton "Tax-Driven Relocation..." cit., p. 197. Regarding the application in the spanish 
case law of the tie breaker rules see NAVARRO IBARROLA, Aitor "Los criterios para dirimir la doble 
residencia internacional en la jurisprudencia española", in Quincena Fiscal nº 9, 2012.  
37
 The controverse arised because of the interpretation of the relevant tie breaker rules by the Tax Court 
of Second Instance, as in rejecting the appeal of the taxpayer the Court disregarded the evidence 
related with his residence in Monaco, taking into account only the facts and circumstances that linked 
the singer with Italy. The main reason seems to be that the income-producing activities of the artist 
would lead to the paradoxical result of an individual not having a domicile and therefore not having any 
tax liability other than the one arising from his residence in Monaco, where no individual income tax is 
levied. See ROTONDARO, Carmine "The Pavarotti Case", in European Taxation vol. 40, 2000, p. 388. 
38
 Verb. reactions in the case of Gerard Depardieu, a french actor who balked at France’s 75% 
millionaires tax -finally blocked by France’s Constitutional Council- announced a move to Belgium and 
then Russia, where it was granted him citizenship. The french Prime Minister has stated that he find 
Depardieu behavior miserly (in French minable) starting a heavily debate about the so called "tax 
exiled"; see WOOD, Robert W. "New 'Tax Residence' Means Moving (Just Ask Gerard Depardieu)", in 
Forbes webpage, in http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/03/05/new-tax-residence-means-
moving-just-ask-gerard-depardieu/ (last review on September 5th 2013). 
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home and sources of income remain in the emigration country, tax authorities could 
use these facts as an evidence to prove that the individual still maintains its residence 
in that country. That is the reason why double residence conflicts arise, and the 
solution uses to be uncertain and may not always be based on tiebreaker rules or a 
proper interpretation of it.  
Although changes in residence are surrounded by relevant non-tax implications 
and may constitute a radical measure, many other different routes can be followed to 
minimize individuals tax burden depending on the jurisdictions involved, specially in 
wealth, inheritance and gift taxes. In this sense, assets can be reallocated to another 
jurisdiction to avoid double taxation39, wealth can be reorganized to be invested in tax-
favored assets, or could be transferred to low-taxed entities if CFC rules in the 
residence country do not affect individuals. Anyhow, for income tax purposes the 
possibilities for reducing the tax burden are much lower, despite certain regimes that 
in combination with other jurisdictions rules may produce striking results. 
In this respect, in the United Kingdom and Ireland40, a person who is resident 
but not domiciled there is typically subject to tax only on income from sources within 
that country; while foreign source income is taxable merely if it is remitted into the 
country41. This tax regime has been in the center of the political debate but despite the 
proposals for its reform, the fact is that is still in force and attracts to the United 
Kingdom new taxpayers, converting this country in a sort of tax haven under the cover 
39
 This result is often achieved in the area of income taxation because of the large tax treaty network 
that ensure, in most cases, the elimination of any double taxation. However, in respect of gift and 
inheritance taxes, international double taxation often occurs, because each country has its own criteria 
in levying inheritance taxes (for example, residence of the deceased, residence of the heir, nationality of 
the deceased and location of certain assets), which do not take into account the criteria of other 
countries. As a result of the differing criteria for levying inheritance taxes, which are also applied 
differently by each country, double or even triple taxation can easily occur; see VAN ZANTBEEK, Anton 
"Tax-Driven Relocation..." cit., p. 197. 
40
 And also in Japan, Singapore and Switzerland and other countries with the intention of attracting 
Mobile skilled labour; see DIRKIS, Michael “The Expression “Liable to Tax by Reason of His Domicile, 
Residence” Under Art. 4(1) of the OECD Model Convention”, in MAISTO, Guglielmo. (ed.) Residence of 
Individuals… cit., pp. 147-148. The last country in to enact a similar regime has been Portugal by Decree-
Law nr. 249/2009, of September 23, for non-habitual resident individuals. The regime would be granted 
to individuals who became resident for tax purposes in Portugal without having had this status in the 
five years preceding its acquisition, and would apply for a ten year period. 
41
 See DE BROE, Luc"General Report", in IFA The Tax Treatment of the Transfer... cit., p. 25. 
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of the European Union42, even after its reform in 2008 and 201143. Besides, this tax 
regime could lead to potential conflicts of dual residence, because since the non-dom 
normally keeps assets and income sources outside the United Kingdom, his emigration 
country could easily consider him as a resident. Even more, as the non-dom is taxed 
just on income from domestic sources, one could doubt about his consideration as 
resident for tax treaty purposes, because of the wording of the second sentence in Art. 
4(1) of the OECD MC, according to which  residence for tax treaties “does not include 
any person who is liable to tax in that State in respect only of income from sources in 
that State or capital situated therein”. And there is not a common solution for this 
question, because it will depend upon the view addopted by the envolved states in 
relation to the interpretation of what “liable to tax” means44. 
Anyways, in order to solve this question, the 2003 Revisions on the 
Commentaries to the OECD MC has added a Para 26.1 in Art. 4, trying to clarify that in 
cases of remittance base taxation taxpayers are not subject to potential double 
taxation to the extent that foreign income is not remitted to their state of residence. If 
in this case it is considered inappropriate to give them the benefit of the provisions of 
the tax treaty on such income, the Commentaries recommend that contracting states 
which agree to restrict the application of the provisions of the tax treaty to income 
that is effectively taxed in the hands of non-doms, should do so by adding a specific 
provision to their tax treaties. 
3.2. Residence of companies and tax planning. 
42
 See the critics to this tax regime, and a description of its effects in attracting wealthy taxpayers in 
LANGER, Marshall J. "Harmful Tax Competition: Who are the Real Tax Havens?, in Tax Notes 
International, 18 December 2000, pp.6-7. 
43
 In 2008 new legislation was introduced to provide that an individual who has been resident in the UK 
for seven or more years out of the last ten years would be obliged to pay an annual levy of £30.000 
should they wish to continue to take advantage of taxation remittance basis. UK government in its 2011 
Budget has reviewed the position and taxation of non-doms again. While recognising the valuable 
contribution that non-doms make to the economy, the government considered that the rules as they 
stood could discourage the investment of their foreign income and capital gains in the UK, and because 
of this reason there will no longer be a charge to tax when a non-dom individual remits foreign income 
or capital gains to make commercial investments in business in the UK.    
44
 DIRKIS, Michael “The Expression…” cit., p. 149; for the UK solution to this question LEMOS, Marika 
“United Kingdom”, in MAISTO, Guglielmo Residence of Individuals… cit., p. 617. Many of the UK tax 
treaties contain a provision to limit relief from source state taxation in such cases to the ammount that 
is taxed -after remittance- in the UK. 
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As regards legal entities, the first tax motivated decision to make -and thus the 
first one to thoroughly plan- is to choose the place of incorporation and legal seat, 
because these elements are decisive to determine tax residence in a given country. 
Obviously the decision about where to incorporate a company is influenced by other 
non-tax considerations, but the tax burden imposed plays an important role45. This is a 
logical consequence if we take into account tax competition between states and the 
heterogeneous, asymmetric domestic law criteria to define the corporate residence 
which lead to tax planning possibilities and tax arbitrage. Some of these possibilities, 
i.e. special purpose entities like conduit or base companies, holding companies, etc. 
have already been analysed and a proper response has been developed in both tax 
treaty and domestic tax laws46. Hence, we will not refer to this kind of tax planning 
issues but to the ones related to residence determination and criteria utilized to that 
effect. 
The first and most evident alternative to reduce the tax burden is to 
incorporate companies or establish their legal seat on a tax haven. Nevertheless this 
option is far from being optimal, not only because the fight against tax havens is one of 
the biggest concerns in the international tax agenda47 but also because operating in 
those territories raise many issues concerning a lack of an adequate legal framework 
and difficulties in raising capital. Thus, apart from the existence of tax measures that 
tackle the use of tax havens48, issues concerning legal, financial and related matters 
severely limit their use. This occurs mostly because tax havens maneuvers indeed are 
45
 As SHAVIRO, Daniel "The Rising Tax-Electivity…” cit., pp. 404 ss. pointed out, there are evidences in 
the field of start-ups, because tax haven incorporations arose to 10% of U.S. incorporations in the period 
2005-2009 (and peaked at 30% in 2008). 
46
 Probably for this reason, in OECD Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing 2013, 
avalaible at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264192744-en (last review Septembre 5th 2013) there is 
only one reference to conduit structures that are set up to channel investments and intra-group 
Financing from one country to another, and a mención in p. 22, note 6 as an example of special purpose 
entities. See about this tax planning schemes and base companies OECD “R(6). Double taxation 
conventions and the use of conduit companies”, in Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
2010: Full Version, OECD Publishing 2012, avalaible in http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264175181-99-en; 
also DE BROE, Luc International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse, IBFD, Amsterdam 2008, pp. 5 ss. 
with further references. 
47
 True, besides exchange of information developments with some tax havens we are quite skeptical 
about the genuine will to fight against tax havens, whose dissapearance has been announced too many 
times already; see HISHIKAWA, Akiko “The Death of Tax Havens?”, in Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review vol. 25, 2002, pp. 389 ss. 
48
 Analyzed in ARNOLD, Brian J. and DIBOUT, Patrick “General Report”, in IFA Limits on the use of low-tax 
regimes by multinational businesses : current measures and emerging trenes, Cahiers de Droit Fiscal 
International, vol. LXXXVIb, Kluwer, The Netherlands 2001.  
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not necessary to reduce the tax burden due to the existence of preferential regimes in 
many OECD countries and the possibility to reach them by sophisticated tax planning. 
In this sense, the place of incorporation has lost relevance due to the 
decentralized structure that characterizes multinational enterprises, which are 
increasingly detaching the place where they are incorporated or their legal seat, and 
the places where they manage cash and group finances, intangible assets 
management, or where R&D activities are developed. As a matter of fact, in the past 
few years the most notorious cases discussed are related with the so-called “low taxed 
branches"49, a concept contained in the OECD Report on Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting. 
In this kind of schemes a company can be incorporated and also have the legal 
seat in a high tax jurisdiction, achieving a low effective tax rate on the income received 
by providing loans, licences or services through a foreign branch that is subject to a 
low tax regime. This tax planning is specially convenient because one does not need 
even to access to a country that is formally considered a low tax jurisdiction since an 
accurate selection among preferential tax regimes implemented in OECD countries 
allows to obtain low taxation for interest, royalties etc. in the branch country. The only 
requirement to fulfill to get substantial tax savings is to locate the parent company in a 
country with an exemption regime for foreing branches income, either under domestic 
law or under the tax treaty network. 
Back again on residence election matters, the use of different connecting 
factors in domestic tax laws may cause that two countries concurrently treat a 
company as  resident for tax purposes. Far beyond difficulties on the application of the 
place of effective management criterion as tiebreaker rule in tax treaties scenarios -
according to Art. 4(3) OECD MC- it must be stressed that these double residence 
schemes may sometimes be desired for tax planning purposes. At first glance, a 
company may want to avoid being considered resident in more than one country, 
49
 OECD Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing 2013, p. 40, avalaible at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264192744-en (last review Septembre 5th 2013). As an example of this 
practices one could take the structure implemented by Google providing his advertising services in the 
UK from Google Ireland, due to the lower corporate tax rate in the last country. See HOUSE OF 
COMMONS COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, Tax Avoidance–Google. Ninth Report of Session 2013–
14, avalaible in the House of Commons Internet website, at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmpubacc/112/112.pdf (last review 
Septembre 5th 2013). 
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especially in the absence of a tax treaty. However, a company may want to be treated 
that way, for instance in order to benefit of dual consolidated loss transactions, which 
is a well-known example of international tax arbitrage50. 
In this kind of cases, a duplication of tax benefits is obtained through the 
intentional use of a company incorporated in the United States but managed and 
controlled in another country and therefore resident in both countries under their tax 
laws. Through borrowings or by other means, the dual resident company is placed in a 
loss position and the loss is claimed in each country through consolidation and group 
relief rules, as an offset to positive income in each country. As stated, there are no 
diffuse, indirect, or accidental elements in this planning51, which could be developed 
just within few countries and therefore serves as an incentive to shift investment in 
that direction. This background is directly related with the residence rule for 
corporations, which varies widely and, in the case of the United States, is essentially 
elective52. 
Another reason for which a dual-resident company might be interesting for tax 
planning purposes relates to the application of tax treaties. As Art. 4(1) OECD MC 
defines the term “resident of a contracting State” by reference to domestic law, a 
company may want access to a (more beneficial) treaty network of another country 
through a dual residence company. It is obvious that changing the status of a company 
from single residence to dual residence creates access to the tax treaties of the 
secondary residence country and any other lower withholding tax rates provided in 
those treaties without necessarily increasing the overall tax burden53. In this regard, 
one could understand the OECD attempt to counter such practices by updating the 
50
 VAN DAELE, Jan "Tax Residence and the Mobility of Companies: Borderline Cases under Private 
International Law and Tax Law", in European Taxation vol. 51, 2011, p. 194. This kind of tax arbitrage 
achieves a tax “advantage” in one jurisdiction that is doubled in another jurisdiction; in Germany it is 
well know the case of the so called double dip leasing structure with Switzerland, due to the differences 
in the rules for to decide on when a taxpayer has the economic ownership of an asset. The Finance Bill 
2013 has enacted new dual consolidation loss rules according to which a loss in a German Tax group 
(Organschaft) is to be disregarded -without carry fordward-  for Germany tax purposes to the extent it is 
taken into account under a foreign tax regime applied to the controlling entity, the controlled entity or 
any other related party. 
51
 ROSENBLOOM, H. David “International Tax Arbitrage..." cit., p. 148, making reference to the Dual 
Resident Companies in the United States.  
52
 RING, Diane M. "One Nation Among Many: Policy implications of Cross Border Tax Arbitrage", in 
Boston College Lae Review vol. 44, 2002, pp. 116-117. 
53
 VAN RAAD, Kees “Dual Residence”, in European Taxation, vol. 8 , 1988, p. 245, apud. VAN DAELE, Jan 
"Tax Residence..." cit., p. 194. 
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OECD MC Commentary in 200854 in which a broad interpretation of the second 
sentence of Art. 4(1) of the OECD MC was introduced. Even more, one could admit 
that a dual residence conflict should be solved according to the tie breaker rule in Art. 
4(3) of OECD MC. However, there are many arguments against the method contained 
in Para. 8.2 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 4 of the OECD Model, which is based on 
an incorrect interpretation of the second sentence of Art. 4(1) of the OECD Model, a 
provision that clearly was not intended to deal with such situations55. In this sense one 
has to bear in mind that in dealing with this problems John Avery Jones has stated that 
the solution "requires an addition to article 4 to be contained in all relevant treaties"56. 
This statement is quite significative if we take into account that -in a similar manner as 
Para. 8.2 of the Commentary to Art. 4(1)- he proposed that Art. 4 "would provide that 
a treaty resident of a state was a person who is liable to tax in that state under internal 
law by reason of the listed criteria but excluding a state that was the loser under a dual 
residence provision of any other treaty"57. Notwithstanding it should be obvious that, 
from a legal point of view, a solution that requires a modification of the tax treaty 
network cannot be obtained through a change in the OECD Model Commentaries. 
As a consequence, even if sometimes dual residence companies could raise 
certain issues, an opportunity to tax planning may also be present due to the 
asymmetry on the determination of tax residence criteria by domestic law. Moreover, 
the use of domestic tax law different connecting factors generates loopholes that 
could be used to develop tax planning schemes such as double non-residence 
scenarios or, to put it in other words, a sort of worldwide non-residence or tax 
statelessness. Precisely, the U.S. Senate Memorandum in Apple Inc.58 describes the 
54
 The modification of Para. 8.2 of the Commentary to Art. 4(1) OECD MC was introduced in order to 
state that " According to its wording and spirit the second sentence also excludes from the definition of 
a resident of a Contracting State (...) companies and other persons who are not subject to 
comprehensive liability to tax in a Contracting State because these persons, whilst being residents of 
that State under that State’s tax law, are considered to be residents of another State pursuant to a 
treaty between these two States". 
55
 VAN DAELE, Jan "Tax Residence..." cit., p. 195. 
56
 AVERY JONES, John F. "Are Tax Treaties Necessary?", in Tax Law Review, vol. 53, 1999-2000, pp. 35-
36. 
57
 AVERY JONES, John F. "Are Tax Treaties..." cit. p. 35. 
58
 PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS U.S. SENATE Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. 
Tax Code - Part 2 (Apple Inc.), 2013 avalaible in the website, 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/offshore-profit-shifting-and-the-
us-tax-code_-part-2 (last review Septembre 5th 2013). 
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unexpected consequences of the interplay between residence definitions in the 
domestic law of Ireland an the United States. While incorporated in Ireland, Apple 
Operations International (its primary offshore holding company) and Apple Sales 
International (its primary intellectual property rights recipient), are managed and 
controlled in the United States. With this structure, Apple takes advantage of the 
disparity between Irish and United States tax residency rules, because the companies 
are tax residents neither in Ireland -where residence is determined by the central 
management and control test- nor in the United States -where residence is 
determined by the incorporation under the laws of any State-, and therefore claims to 
have no tax residence in any jurisdiction. Quoting the Subcommittee statements, 
"Apple has been shifting its profits to its Irish subsidiary that has a tax residence 
nowhere, not to benefit from Ireland’s minimal tax rate, but to take advantage of the 
disparity between Irish and U.S. tax residency rules and thereby avoid paying income 
taxes to any national government"59. 
Although available data are insufficient to properly study this case, it is indeed 
surprising that after an statement on the need of putting a stop to corporations that 
deny tax residence in any jurisdiction, Subcommittee recommendations do not refer to 
residence rules, i.e. the Memorandum states five recommendations related to transfer 
pricing rules, the “check-the-box” and “look-through” rules, CFC rules, the “same 
country exception" and the “manufacturing exception”, but renounces to develop 
guidelines as regards the concept of residence, an aspect which turns to be essential 
after all.  
Differences on domestic residence criteria also give rise to tax-planning 
strategies by means of tax residence changes. Nevertheless, apart from complex 
business restructuring arrangements subject to strict rules that guarantee their 
substance60, hypothetical advantages of a change on residence are reduced due to the 
adoption of anti-avoidance rules and exit taxes by many countries. These rules and 
taxes are controversial as in a certain way may amount to a freedom of establishment 
59
 PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS U.S. SENATE Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. 
Tax Code... cit., p. 28. 
60
 SHAVIRO, Daniel "The Rising Tax-Electivity..." cit., p. 409. 
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restriction which, apart from its presence on EU law system, constitutes a mutual 
standard amongst most of the countries. 
4. TACKLING TAX PLANNING THROUGH RESIDENCE.
As tax planning schemes are set up on the basis of the heterogeneous nature of 
various residence definitions, this will almost always imply an improper use of tax 
treaties and hence, one could opt to tackle this schemes through the traditional 
methods for curbing treaty-shopping practices, which existed since the 1977 OECD 
MC. Even if successive changes on OECD Commentaries have included few measures in 
order to allow treaty benefits only to entities having a sufficient nexus with the 
residence country, most of the OECD anti treaty-shopping provisions tend to be broad 
and vague, likely to generate interpretational difficulties when applied in practice61. 
The analysis of these measures is out of the scope of this paper, in which we 
will focus our attention on two specific types of provisions, directly related to changes 
in residence: extended tax liabilities or trailing taxes as protective measure, and exit 
taxes. On the one hand, unlimited extended tax liability, which is based on the 
assumption that the emigrated taxpayer continues to qualify as a deemed resident of 
the country of former residence despite the fact that he has established his residence 
for tax purposes in another country. On the other hand, exit taxes that treat the act of 
emigration as a taxable event, resulting in the deemed alienation of all (or some) items 
of property, affecting the latent income tax liability that exists at the time of 
emigration62. In any case, both kind of measures, when applied by emigration 
countries would conflict with tax treaties and therefore are in some way controversial. 
4.1. The extension of residence. 
Obviously, the emigration country can always counteract alleged transfers of 
residence that actually did not happen by considering them as a mere sham, according 
to their domestic rules or doctrines. In this case it is out of doubt that when applying 
61
 Probably, except the LOB provisions, as pointed out AVI YONAH, Reuven S. and HJI PANAYI, Christiana 
“Rethinking Treaty Shopping: Lessons for the European Union”, in AAVV Tax Treaties: Buildig Bridges 
between Law and Economics, IBFD, Amsterdam 2010, p. 33. 
62
 For a broader information on the topics see DE BROE, Luc "General Report" cit., pp. 29 ss. and Branch 
Reports in IFA The Tax Treatment of the Transfer... cit., pp. 97 ss. 
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sham provisions or jurisprudence the tax authorities are determining which facts give 
rise to a tax liability, and acting according with tax treaties63. Indeed there is a growing 
attention by tax authorities in this field, especially when the individual moves to a tax 
haven or a neighbour country known for permitting the taxpayer to realize in a tax free 
manner income or gains which would not have been exempt absent the transfer of 
residence. 
Even if we admit an actual transfer of residence, emigration countries may 
apply defensive measures in order to limit tax-motivated behaviors. In this sense, the 
Scandinavian countries have enacted legislation in order to deny non-residence status 
to temporary non-residents (short-term leavers) in the framework of their unlimited 
extended tax liabilities. In this sense, the rules basically provide for a reversal on the 
burden of proof, i.e. it is the taxpayer instead of the tax authorities who has to give 
evidence that he has effectively cut off all substantial ties with the country of former 
residence. Even if one could understand the policy behind this kind of rules, as far as 
the limited tax liability should concern only persons who have actually moved away 
from the emigration country, its content is open to criticism. 
First, it is far from clear which pieces of evidence should or must the taxpayer 
provide in order to prove that he has actually moved to another country, and specially 
which weight a certificate of residence will have as an evidence. Proportionality 
principle should play its role in the task of looking for proper solutions and their strict 
adherence to the law, specially regarding the certificate of residence dissimilar 
significance amongst different jurisdictions. This should also be a concern from the tax 
treaties perspective, because if tax authorities impose a higher burden of proof on the 
taxpayer in trying to determine his residence than the one required in a pure domestic 
case, an issue arises on whether this is compatible with the objectives and purpose of 
the tax treaty64. 
Second, this kind of rules seems to be barely compatible with tax treaties that 
are normally based on residence and do not give any special taxing rights to the state 
63
 As in all pure sham cases; see ZORNOZA, Juan J. and BÁEZ, Andrés “The 2003 Revisions on the 
Commentary to the OECD Model  on Tax Treaties and GAARS: a Mistaken Starting Point”, in AAVV “Tax 
Treaties…” cit., pp. 135 ss. 
64
 LANG, Michael "General Report", in IFA Double non-taxation, Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International, vol. 
89a, Kluwer, The Netherlands 2004, p. 92. 
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on which the taxpayer is a national. In this sense, the application of these rules by the 
emigration country will very likely result in a conflict of residence with the immigration 
country, which will generally be solved in favor of the latter under the tax treaty 
tiebreaker rules. Besides, an unlimited extended tax liability under domestic law 
cannot effectively be imposed on emigrants under tax treaties if it does not specifically 
allow the emigration country to do so. Indeed, unlimited extended tax liabilities are 
only effective -under tax treaty law- provided that the emigration country has 
preserved its rights to apply such extended tax liability in the relevant tax treaty. 
Hence, countries applying this kind of domestic rules have promoted tax treaties that 
allow the emigration state to tax the former resident according to it65. 
Third, even if the tax treaty permits a residence extension, this kind of measure 
gives rise to international double taxation since both the emigration and the 
immigration country will consider the individual as resident and subject him to tax on 
his worldwide income. Probably both states will give relief (by means of credit or 
exemption) for taxes levied by the other country on income arising in the other 
country that has been subject to tax there66. But this fact is not clear enough, because 
the immigration country may give rise to a double residence conflict and once resolved 
in its favor, give relief just on taxes levied in respect to income sourced in the 
emigration state. Besides, as it is far from clear whether the emigration country will 
give relief for the tax imposed on that third-country income by the immigration 
country, one has to conclude that it is necessary to reflect on the meaning and 
justification of these rules.  
In any case, it has to be remarked that also in this field, differences between 
rules enacted by countries in their domestic laws differ in certain substantial aspects: i) 
there are rules which apply just if the immigration country is a tax haven but other 
immigration country relevant factors are irrelevant ; ii) in some cases taxpayer proof of 
an actual change of residence is permitted, while in other cases a deemed residence 
rule establishes a iuris et de iure presumption of residence; and iii) the period for 
extended tax liability is generally limited to 3, 5 or 10 years, but there are some 
65
 See DE BROE, Luc "general Report" cit., pp. 45 and 68; HELMINEN, Marjaana "Finland", in IFA The Tax 
Treatment of the Transfer... cit., pp. 238-239 
66
 DE BROE, Luc "General Report" cit., p. 61. 
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scenarios in which the extended residence seems to be forever after, and this may be 
considered a plain abuse. 
At last, the measures at stake pose evident management issues, because if the 
emigrant taxpayer does not have any assets on the emigration country, it will be 
difficult to levy the tax, except through cooperation mechanisms between tax 
administrations. Thus, it is notable that when analyzing individual transfers of 
residence treatment no specific recovery methods for taxes owed by former residents 
where reported. This is remarkable because the emigration country is often left with 
little or no assets against which tax claims could be recovered, and cannot rely on an 
expanded treaty network for the cross-border recovery of taxes, due to the lack of 
cooperation in this field outside the European Union67. 
4.2. Exit taxes. 
The second kind of measures adopted by emigration countries to counteract 
the transfer of residence for tax purposes are the so-called "exit taxes", which treat 
the act of emigration as a taxable event resulting in the deemed alienation of the 
emigrant assets, affecting the latent income tax liability that exists at the time of 
emigration. As in this area a large number of figures exist with many different 
configurations, to develop a proper analysis in this regard seems to be impossible68, so 
general considerations should be made regarding a kind of measures that affects both 
individuals and companies. 
Among them, the first that one has to consider are those that aim at 
accelerating the payment of tax liabilities that the taxpayer incurred in the country 
from which he moves; even if these are not properly exit taxes. In this sense, in order 
to ensure that an emigrant has no outstanding liabilities, several countries have 
introduced a “pay as you go” system and, either ex officio or at the discretion of the 
tax authorities requires to the taxpayers who gives up his residence in the country to 
67
 DE BROE, Luc "General Report" cit., p. 32. There has been an important progress in this field, because 
since January 1st 2012 mutual recovery assistance is governed by the Council Directive 2010/24/EU 
which extends the scope of the recovery assistance to all taxes and duties levied by EU Member States. 
It also introduces a European instrument permitting enforcement in another Member State as the sole 
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comply with certain administrative formalities in view of imposing an advance 
assessment and to pay all taxes due for the year of departure69. 
Both general exit taxes and limited exit taxes on certain capital gains -normally 
those derived from shares and securities- raison d'être is related with the interplay 
between the non-residents taxation in the emigration country and tax treaties70. A 
general exit tax focuses on taxation of income that could not be taxed after the change 
of residence because this practice may be forbidden by non-resident tax regime or 
double tax treaties. However, if the exit tax just affects the former resident’s non-
realized gains that could not be taxed after its change of residence because of the 
applicable double tax treaty, this measure may certainly contravene the treaty in 
force. Hence, it seems senseless to apply a general exit tax for latent capital gains that 
corresponds to assets which remain at the emigration country where a tax could be 
levied in accordance with the non residents domestic tax regime and tax treaties in 
force. This measure may seem disproportionate, as the emigration state power to tax 
and the collection of taxes are adequately guaranteed. 
Taking this justification into account, the balanced allocation of taxing rights 
between jurisdictions seems to be the only possible ground for levying exit taxes, 
which implies they must be aimed at taxing gains that accrued while the person was 
resident in the country of emigration and could not be taxed after the transfer of 
residence71. This raises some requirements for the correct articulation of the exit 
taxes, in the sense that it should be limited to the gains that the emigration country 
could not tax after the transfer of residence because of the tax treaties in force. This is 
a proper way to protect the territoriality principle in the international field and at the 
same time force states to take responsibility on the task of designing an efficient tax 
on non-residents. Hence, no immediate taxation of unrealized gains should be allowed 
if, in the domestic scenario, the country of emigration does not tax the gains; not just 
for the sake of consistency -this assessment could not be justified by the need for a 
69
 DE BROE, Luc "General Report" cit., p. 32. 
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proper allocation of taxing rights- but also to respect non-discrimination rules. Besides, 
as the exit tax applies to unrealized gains it is doubtful whether, or not, the country of 
emigration should take into account any decreases in the value of the assets after the 
person ceases to be a resident. Even if the European Court of Justice has suggested 
this position in N case one cannot agree with this view because it is not coherent with 
the allocation of the power to tax since the country of emigration will not be able to 
tax increases in value after the transfer of residence72. Lastly, to adequately levy tax on 
latent capital gains, valuation rules are critical because due to the non existence of a 
real transaction, discussions regarding the tax base determination will always exist.  
In the exit taxes the accrued capital gains are taxed in the residence state of the 
owners, just before they ceased to be resident for tax purposes, even though no actual 
alienation has occurred, on the grounds of a legislative fiction. Therefore, these taxes 
are levied on non-realized capital gains, which may be problematic from an ability to 
pay principle point of view and can give rise to liquidity issues73. Because it is far from 
clear if the need for a balance allocation of taxing rights can justify the exit taxes from 
an internal constitutional point of view in the countries in which ability to pay is a 
constitutional principle for the tax system. Even if the illiquidity argument is not 
convincing, because the tax authorities can provide for financial facilities -i.e. tax 
deferrals or payments plans- there are serious concerns in relationship with the 
valuation problem74. Because it the exit tax is not perfectly designed, could result in 
the assessment of a capital gain that could never exist. 
The most controversial aspect on exit taxes is however related with its 
compatibility with tax treaties and the double taxation that may arise from applying it. 
In this respect, neither the OECD MC, nor the UN MC contain a specific provision on 
exit or expatriation taxes, whether on individuals or companies; even if in recent years, 
states have begun amending and redrafting their bilateral treaty provisions in an 
attempt to eliminate double taxation in these cases. It is truth that international tax 
law does not prohibit countries from imposing exit taxes on their residents, and for 
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this reason emigration countries believe that the introduction of exit taxes does not 
constitute a treaty override. The main arguments in this sense are the following: i) as 
exit taxes are assessed just before the tax liability based on residence ceases, one can 
say that at the time of imposition of the exit tax the taxpayer is a resident of the 
country imposing the tax; ii) as tax treaties allocate taxing rights in the case of 
alienation of assets, conflict issues do not arise because exit taxes are not imposed on 
the occasion of the alienation; iii) no double taxation occurs -at least in a proper sense- 
since double taxation implies that two different countries tax the same income at the 
same time, which is not the case in exit taxes that are levied only in the emigration 
country. 
Notwithstanding, these arguments are not persuasive enough, because exit 
taxes are contrary to the tax treaties allocation of taxing rights standards. In this sense, 
both the OECD MC and the UN MC allocate taxing rights on capital gains on assets 
(other than real property, permanent establishment assets and ships and aircraft) in a 
clear way. The exclusive right to tax gains on items of personal property is granted to 
the state of residence of the alienator, except, under the UN model, where the right to 
tax gains on substantial shareholdings is allocated to the country where the company 
is established. One has to assume that countries that use such models without any 
reservation do accept that taxpayers could one day transfer their residence and thus 
that emigration countries could lose their taxing rights by virtue of such provisions75. 
It is truth that Para. 7 of the Commentaries on Art. 13 OECD MC states that 
"(T)here are, ..., tax laws under which capital appreciation and revaluation of business 
assets are taxed even if there is no alienation". Moreover, as the term "alienation" has 
to be interpreted broadly, in order to cover all the transactions or events generating a 
gain in the domestic law, one could think that the cases of deemed alienation fall 
under the scope of Art. 1376. However, once properly contextualized, this statement 
does not lead to support the view that countries are entitled to tax unrealized gains 
that accrued prior to emigration. First, because if we take into account OECD MC prior 
versions it is not easy to affirm that a transfer of residence is an "alienation" for Art. 13 
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OECD MC purposes77. Second, because Para 8, 9 and 10 of the Commentaries, when 
dealing with the taxation of the capital appreciation of an asset that has not been 
alienated, do mention only the revaluation of assets in the books and the transfer of 
an asset from a permanent establishment situated in the territory of one state to a 
permanent establishment or the head office of the same enterprise situated in 
another state. Hence, if just these two cases are assimilated to an alienation of 
property, is becomes hard to accept that other options on establishing an exit tax on 
deemed alienation may fit on Art. 13 OECD MC. 
In any case, it is out of doubt that exit taxes create double taxation, and it may 
be questioned whether the notion of double taxation as defined above is not too 
narrow: what matters is not that two taxes are imposed in the same year, but that 
such taxes relate to income that accrued during identical periods78. From this point of 
view, it is clear enough that an expatriation event that results in a deemed alienation 
of property also has the potential for double taxation or even triple, because on top to 
the exit tax in the expatriation country one should consider the tax on the capital gains 
levied by the immigration country -as residence state- and eventually the tax levied by 
the source country when the assets where located in a third country and the relevant 
tax treaty allows it79. Hence, the current enactment of new domestic exit taxes 
without taking any measure to avoid international double taxation and leaving it up to 
the immigration country to do so either unilaterally or at best via a mutual agreement 
procedure under a DTC seems not to be acceptable80. 
Finally, even if it has been considered that one of the goals of an exit tax is the 
prevention of tax avoidance, the anti-avoidance intention does not justify in itself the 
imposition of exit taxes. It is truth that Para. 9 of the Commentaries to Art. 1 OECD MC 
considers that emigration to realize capital gains in a tax free manner in another 
country of residence constitutes a treaty abuse. But that even if one could accept that 
the Commentaries are a sufficient ground for the enforcement of domestic anti-abuse 
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measures in a treaty context81, Para. 10 of the Commentaries suggests that the 
contracting states should agree that the tax treaty in question does not affect the 
applicability of domestic anti-abuse provisions. Notwithstanding, exit taxes are 
introduced unilaterally without due regard to the tax regime applicable abroad and 
very few treaties explicitly authorize their assessment on a bilateral basis, thus are 
against the intention expressed in Para 10 of the Commentaries to Art. 1. 
As the number of countries introducing exit taxes is likely to increase, it seems 
necessary to reconsider exit taxes in order to align them with tax treaties and the aim 
of preventing double taxation. In this sense, the determination of a common value of 
the relevant property items upon transfer of residence should play a critical role. 
Therefore, this system only success if it is enacted on a bilateral or multilateral basis. 
Also, it is highly recommended to include a procedure for the determination of such a 
common value between the competent authorities of the two countries involved and 
the taxpayer, eventually with an appeal or arbitration procedure82. Moreover, if exit 
taxes raison d’ être lies on a balanced allocation of taxing powers one might ask for 
proper mechanisms to achieve this purpose. In principle, exchange of information and 
administrative assistance procedures should be enough to guarantee the chance of the 
emigration country to require assessment of the capital gain generated during the 
period of residence, avoiding the undesirable effects of exit taxes. 
5. CONCLUSIONS.
As stated, the interplay between diverse criteria employed by domestic laws to 
define residence may generate arbitrage and tax planning possibilities encouraged by 
countries’ tax competition practices. Attempts to limit those possibilities have forced 
states to adopt certain measures that frequently give rise to tax treaties compatibility 
issues or tax treaty override behaviours. 
The analysis developed allowed us to check how the awareness of these 
problems has not prompted a reflection on the concept of residence used in tax 
treaties, which appears to be content empty and, therefore, is only anchored by the 
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effect of producing an unlimited liability to tax. However, it is clear that 
reconsideration on the residence definition and the suitability of maintaining criteria 
no longer adequate to achieve proper results should be developed. We do not 
disbelieve that residence should continue to serve as a connecting factor, but current 
criteria for its determination do not seem the most appropriate in a world in which 
mobility of persons and production factors is higher than ever. 
Significant changes in a highly globalized economy, in which interconnected 
markets and agents smoothly interact, have not been reflected in tax treaty 
agreements or, at least, not in the structure and contents of the OECD MC and UN MC. 
The frequency with which changes occur in the Commentaries to those MC contrasts 
with the unvarying nature of their texts, which reflect outdated income tax categories -
typical of ancient impersonal taxes- that do not correspond to the current reality. As a 
matter of fact, the MC as we know them are by full unsuitable for the treatment of 
international economic transactions, as shown by the difficulties on the treatment of 
hybrid financial products, hybrid entities, etc. 
Despite the fact that I am not optimistic about the possibilities of success of the 
proposals for a global cooperation and coordination on tax matters83, it is true that it 
an in depth reconsideration of the MC seems necessary. A reconsideration that will 
probably require a harmonization of tax treaties institutions and concepts, and that 
seems particularly necessary as regards the residence determination, as the main pillar 
on the definition of tax treaties subjective scope. This kind of harmonization may limit 
arbitrage possibilities in a much more effective way than any of the measures already 
analyzed, whose suitability in the international tax law arena is more than 
questionable. 
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